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Abstract 
This paper explores the role of non-hegemonic sexualities in urban renewal 
through a case study of a Kansas City, Missouri redevelopment project. Using 
document analysis, interviews, and participant observation, I argue that sexual 
diversity is co-opted in a raced, classed, and gendered way that advances growth 
objectives and reinforces heteronormativity and the bourgeois cultural and social 
values of private property and conspicuous consumption. While economically 
privileged, white, gay males are courted and attempts are made to co-opt them as 
drivers of renewal, non-conforming sexual expressions, such as sex work, 
pornography, and much of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer 
(LGBTQ) community are excluded. The privatization of once-public spaces 
effectively reifies bourgeois moral boundaries to protect new consumer spaces 
from sexual, racial, and class “others,” and allows space to become a tool for 
capital accumulation. 
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Introduction 
 With the onset of suburbanization in post-World War II United States, metropolitan 
regions across the nation experienced rapidly declining central cities. The channeling of vital 
resources away from inner cities and towards suburbs resulted in dilapidated infrastructure and 
increasing urban poverty (Avila and Rose 2009). Since the 1980s, cities have taken increasingly 
dramatic measures to revive their downtowns, ranging from the militant eviction of homeless 
people from Tompkins Square Park in New York’s Lower East Side (Smith 1996) to the 
implementation of large-scale, government-backed urban renewal efforts (Davidson and Lees 
2010; Hackworth 2007). The trend has been towards public-private mega-projects that attempt to 
harness “culture” as a tool for urban regeneration (Miles and Paddison 2005). This generally 
means the construction of areas for the exclusive consumption of culture—art, food, fashion, 
music, tourism—resulting in public spaces devoted to consumption rather than tolerance or 
social solidarity (Zukin 1998). Increasingly, however, consumption of culture also concerns 
people and place, with diversity—sexual, racial, ethnic, etc.—becoming a sought-after 
demographic characteristic for business and tourism (Hoffman 2003; Zukin 1998). As Rose 
states, “post-industrial cities have a growing interest in marketing themselves as being built on a 
foundation of ‘inclusive’ neighborhoods capable of harmoniously supporting a blend of incomes, 
cultures, age-groups, and lifestyles” (2004:281). With the popularization of Richard Florida’s 
(2002) “creative class” thesis,1
Given this appeal to diversity, remarkably little scholarly research has been devoted to 
the role of sexual diversity in large-scale urban renewal (for notable exceptions see 
 many cities have attempted to do just this.  
Delany 1999; 
Hubbard 2004; Papayanis 2000). Thus the purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship 
between urban renewal and sexualities by using a Kansas City, Missouri urban renewal project 
2 
 
as a case study. This project, called the Power and Light District (henceforth P&L), is a large-
scale effort between the city of Kansas City and the Cordish Company, a private real estate 
development firm. From its inception, project proponents have touted the P&L’s diverse appeal, 
sometimes even citing Florida’s “creative class” thesis (Collison 2003b), but the project has also 
been plagued by accusations of racial, sexual, gender, and class discrimination. Why do these 
perceptions exist for an area meant to increase Kansas City’s cosmopolitan appeal? 
Many scholars contend that gentrification and urban renewal are exclusionary, through 
forced eviction or segregation of marginalized groups or displacement through rising rents 
(Davidson and Lees 2010; Hackworth 2007; Hubbard 2004)—what Neil Smith (1996) calls the 
“revanchist city.” I devote part of my analysis to evaluating whether or to what extent Kansas 
City’s urban renewal efforts are characterized by this revanchist element before moving on to an 
examination of two ways by which sexual diversity is mobilized in this redevelopment project. 
My central argument is two-fold. First, dedication to a pro-economic growth ideology allows 
once-public spaces to be privatized as a tool for capital accumulation, effectively reifying 
bourgeois moral boundaries to protect these redeveloped urban consumer spaces from sexual, 
racial, and class “others.” Second, sexual diversity is co-opted in this process in a raced, classed, 
and gendered way that advances growth objectives and reinforces the heterosexual, white, 
middle-class, values of heteronormativity, private property, and conspicuous consumption. 
While economically privileged, white, gay males are courted by developers as ideal consumers 
and a marketable form of diversity, non-conforming sexual expressions, such as sex work, 
pornography, and much of the queer community are excluded. 
 This paper is organized into several major sections. I begin with a discussion of the 
literature on gentrification and sexuality before laying the conceptual framework for the rest of 
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the study, which includes elements of Neil Smith’s (1996) revanchist city heuristic and Logan 
and Molotch’s (1987) classic “growth machine” theory. I present my findings in two major 
subsections, first showing the class-based revanchism on which Kansas City’s urban renewal is 
dependent, and then how sexualities are mobilized in service of this economic growth agenda. I 
conclude with a discussion of the implications these developments have for access to public 
space and sexual equality. 
Background 
What is Gentrification? 
 Scholars have debated the constitutive properties of gentrification for decades, and 
disagreement remains (Brown-Saracino 2010; Davidson 2011). Traditionally defined, 
gentrification involves the rehabilitation of existing structures in a dilapidated urban area by an 
influx of middle-class residents who usher in this process (Lambert and Boddy 2002). But 
gentrification is a dynamic process, which has led some scholars to consider new-build 
developments part of the overall process of gentrification (Davidson and Lees 2010). Some 
scholars argue that this is an over-application of the term (Lambert and Boddy 2002), but Smith 
asserts that: 
In my own research I began making a strict distinction between gentrification (which 
involved rehabilitation of existing stock) and redevelopment that involved wholly new 
construction…and at a time when gentrification was distinguishing itself from large-scale 
urban renewal this made some sense. But I no longer feel that it is such a useful 
distinction…Gentrification is no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing 
market but has become the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavor: the class 
remake of the central urban landscape (Smith 1996:39).  
 
Critical consensus has coalesced around at least one aspect of Smith’s definition: gentrification is 
a class-based phenomenon (Davidson 2011). Given the constantly changing nature of social 
structures and the current cultural turn urban renewal has taken, Smith’s definition seems the 
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more appropriate. Ultimately, whether economic rebuilding of urban areas is labeled 
gentrification, urban renewal, or something else, the goal is identical—the class remake of urban 
space. 
 Gentrification and urban renewal are often justified on the grounds that they fix the poor 
urban tax base and break up concentrated poverty (Lees 2008). Because of the alleged taxation 
benefits, governments often encourage or even sponsor large-scale urban renewal efforts 
(Hackworth 2007; Lees 2008; Murphy 2008; Smith 2002). Governments and other entities may 
also tout gentrification as a way of engendering social mixing, though evidence suggests that 
little inter-group mixing occurs. As Lees (2008:2463) asserts, social mixing policies construct 
the middle-class as natural and desirable while demonizing lower classes. 
 Urban renewal is increasingly accomplished via private control of public spaces (Murphy 
2008; Raco 2003; Zukin 1998) or ever-harsher restrictions on the use of public space (Raco 
2003; Ranasinghe 2011; Staeheli and Mitchell 2006), which leads to exclusion. Smith (1996), for 
instance, found that working-class and minority residents are steadily priced out of gentrified 
areas (see also Atkinson 2004; Wyly and Hammel 2004). Rather than engendering social mixing, 
gentrification tends to segregate diverse populations, and those relegated to less desirable areas 
are consistently poor and minority residents. 
Sex and Gentrification 
 Sexualities, particularly LGBTQ sexualities, have long played a role in gentrification. 
Gay men were at the forefront of gentrification efforts in many cities, including West 
Hollywood, CA, Greenwich Village, NY, and Soho in London (Bell and Valentine 1995; Collins 
2004; Knopp 1995). LGBTQ neighborhoods are often looked upon favorably as manifestations 
of increased acceptance of LGBTQ people, and these areas frequently become fashionable 
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entertainment and shopping districts for heterosexuals (Binnie and Skeggs 2004). These spaces 
arose in response to oppression and hostility, and in addition to providing relatively safe areas for 
LGBTQ people to live and do business, they also create a “power base where the gay vote is 
significant” (Bell and Valentine 1995:5). This is an important development in a society where 
space is “produced as heterosexual, heterosexist, and heteronormative” (ibid:18), for it provides 
areas where hegemonic heteronormative scripts can be challenged. Gay villages, however, have 
been criticized for becoming commodified areas of consumption and spectacle and excluding 
large portions of the LGBTQ community that do not have the cultural and economic capital to 
take part in conspicuous consumption (Bell and Binnie 2004; Sibalis 2004). 
 While the creation of LGBTQ urban spaces certainly has positive effects for queer 
populations, it also has negative consequences. On the one hand, the concentration of sexual 
minorities in urban spaces makes it easier to develop communities, networks, and spaces based 
on sexuality, and for this reason these subcultures tend to be more developed in large cities. On 
the other hand, this concentration also makes it easier to control and demonize sexual “others.” 
Knopp (1995:149) argues that, “the portrayal of gentrified gay neighborhoods…as centres of 
hedonism and self-indulgence, of other gay entertainment areas…as dangerous sadomasochistic 
underworlds, of red-light districts as threatening to ‘family values,’ of ‘non-white’ 
neighbourhoods as centres of rape, or, alternatively, of suburbs as places of blissful monogamous 
(and patriarchal) heterosexuality” makes such surveillance possible. Here, Knopp makes an 
important connection between racialized and sexualized spaces—that is, both are seen as 
threatening to white, middle-class, heterosexual values. This is a common theme throughout U.S. 
history, wherein class, race, gender, and ethnicity are all colored by sexual norms and values 
(Nagel 2003). This is especially true of the black-white color line in the United States, where 
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black sexuality has historically been seen as uncontrollable, and black male sexuality, in 
particular, is seen as dangerous to white women (Bardaglio 1999; di Leonardo 1997). 
All types of sexual non-conformity, however, may affect an area. Perhaps the best-known 
example of this is New York City’s Times Square. Before its “cleanup” in the mid-1990s, Times 
Square was home to many adult movie theaters and stores and was a popular area for sex 
workers and LGBTQ people, many of whom were also racial minorities (Delany 1999). These 
areas, even more so than LGBTQ neighborhoods, have been decried as negatively impacting 
society through such “secondary effects” as declining property values, increased crime, and a 
negative impact on “legitimate” business (Papayanis 2000). Such secondary effects are often 
substantiated by impact studies, though as Papayanis reveals in her study of Times Square’s 
cleanup, these studies often rely on “expert” testimony from the very real estate executives who 
stand to benefit the most from clearing out sex shops. In fact, the impact study conducted by the 
New York City Department of City Planning and offered in support of Mayor Guiliani’s 
proposal to zone out sex shops concludes that “The analysis of trends in assessed valuation 
relative to adult entertainment uses was inconclusive” (quoted in Papayanis 2000:345). Citing 
such flawed impact studies as evidence, in a 1967 case the Supreme Court upheld legislation 
allowing adult entertainment to be zoned out of areas in order to protect the quality of a city’s 
neighborhoods (ibid.). In the end, Papayanis concludes that such regulation of sexualized spaces 
serves to reinforce privileged forms of sexual expression, specifically heterosexual monogamy. 
Similarly, in a review of the geographies of sex-related businesses, Hubbard et al (2008) observe 
that whereas sex-related businesses have traditionally been relegated to the margins of cities, 
certain types of businesses have migrated to the central city, indicating both a privileging of 
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certain types of corporate investment and a normalization of certain forms of homosociality and 
heterosexuality. 
Gentrification and urban renewal often speak to an acceptance of diversity, but as 
Hubbard (2004) notes, the consumer city sets up a paradox: all are apparently welcome, but only 
so long as they act in a manner deemed appropriate by the real estate developer. Binnie and 
Skeggs (2004) further note that as Manchester’s gay village became more popular among 
heterosexuals, the more “extreme” aspects of the queer community disappeared. A recent study 
of Atlanta also found that as LGBTQ neighborhoods become more fashionable, they attract more 
heterosexuals, who not only further drive up housing costs but may also be less tolerant of 
LGBTQ people and the businesses that serve them (Doan and Higgins 2011). While “first-wave” 
gentrifiers tended to seek and be accepting of a socially diverse urban experience (Butler and 
Lees 2006), the trend may be shifting. 
Revanchism and the Growth Machine 
 As gentrification demonstrates, space, its meaning, and who is allowed to inhabit it are all 
contested, and because of this, space not only reflects and reinforces social inequalities, it also 
engenders social relations. Unequal access to public space draws attention to inequalities 
stemming from such social categories as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality and reveals 
various people’s differing right to the city. As Tonkiss (2005:5) argues, “The politics of urban 
space…concerns not only contests staged in the city, but contests over competing rights to the 
city. One of the primary rights to the city is the claim to common public space.” Public space is 
often considered to be an essential component of a democratic society—a place for the free 
exchange of ideas and the intermingling of diverse social groups (Harvey 2006; Low and Smith 
2006).  
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What exactly constitutes public space, however, is complicated by the rise of privatism2
Gottdiener 1994
 
in urban spaces. Private banking and real estate interests often seek to privatize urban 
environments for (re)development and private profit ( ), blurring the line between 
public and private space. These “growth machine” (Molotch 1976) actors are primarily 
concerned with the exchange value of urban land and its potential for capital accumulation, 
generally discounting the use value of public spaces. Thus, the use value of the majority is traded 
for the exchange gains of the few and represents a transfer of wealth from the general public to 
the rentier class (Logan and Molotch 1987). Tonkiss (2005:74) summarizes simply: “If different 
types of public space stand for different ways of being together in public (collectivity, social 
exchange, informal encounter), the privatization of public spaces valorizes relationships based on 
private interest.” In place of traditional public spaces, private capital delivers what Davis 
(1992:226) calls “pseudo-public spaces,” such as “sumptuary malls, office centers, cultural 
acropolises and so on.” Consumption thus ascends as the “primary urban function” 
(Christopherson 1994:410). 
This assertion is especially true of the most recent manifestation of urban renewal: large-
scale, top-down, public-private mega-projects. Such projects have the potential to displace many 
people and can result in the rapid redefinition of space and place, which has led Neil Smith 
(1996) to label this trend the “revanchist city.” After the defeat of Napolean III’s government in 
the late 19th century, the Parisian working-class took over the city for several months. 
Determined to reinstate bourgeois morality and order to the streets of Paris, the revanchists 
sought out enemies and enacted vicious revenge upon them for “stealing” their vision of French 
society from them. In Smith’s model, the middle-class “ordinary citizens” reclaim the city from 
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economic, racial, ethnic and sexual “others,” to whom they had left the city in their flight to the 
suburbs. 
Drawing on insights from this era of French history, Smith theorizes a modern process in 
which there is a concerted effort by the ruling-classes to retake the urban “frontier.” At the heart 
of this newly conceptualized revanchism is the fear of losing power, particularly economic 
power:  
a race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and ruling-class whites who are suddenly stuck 
in place by a ravaged property market, the threat and reality of unemployment, the 
decimation of social services, and the emergence of minority and immigrant groups, as 
well as women, as powerful urban actors (Smith 1996:211).  
 
Smith largely focuses on the economic aspects of revanchism, but he also writes that it may be 
characterized overall as “revenge against minorities, the working class, women, environmental 
legislation, gays and lesbian,” (Smith 1996:44) to which Papayanis (2000) adds sexual 
nonconformity of all types. Thus, while urban renewal may be aimed at a class remake of the 
city, an analysis of revanchism requires an intersectional approach, such that the intersecting 
oppressions of race, class, gender, and sexuality are all taken seriously. 
 Recent notions that diversity and cosmopolitanism attract the “creative class” to cities, 
however, contradict the idea that cities wish to exclude “others.” The creation of a cosmopolitan 
space requires that certain people be let in and others excluded, and these exclusionary 
boundaries are often raced and classed (Binnie and Skeggs 2004). Research further suggests that 
a desire for diversity is more of a way to identify as cosmopolitan than a true desire to interact 
with people of differing backgrounds (Butler and Robson 2001), and when people do interact 
with diverse others, it is often with “non-threatening others” who are just different enough to be 
considered “other,” such as white, gay men (Binnie and Skeggs 2004). The rapid redefinition of 
a renewed space, then, requires boundary-work, and as Lamont and Molnar (2002) assert, 
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boundaries may be revealed in space. For example, Sharon Zukin (1993) argues that power 
manifests itself in material form through architecture, and the urban cityscape may be read as a 
“landscape of power.” The “neo-military syntax” of contemporary architecture is read 
immediately by pariah groups as a warning to stay away (Davis 1992), and if that is not enough, 
closed-circuit cameras and private security forces remind such groups that they are being 
monitored. Dress codes, laws, and other policies all further reveal the institutionalization and 
territorialization of symbolic boundaries3
 With the shift from localized gentrification to large-scale urban renewal and cities’ 
apparently paradoxical appeal to diversity, we are finally led to question what role sexualities 
play in urban renewal today. If only certain diverse “others” are to be admitted to renewed urban 
spaces, how and why are these particular boundaries maintained? These are the issues this paper 
will address going forward. 
.  
Studying Kansas City’s Urban Renewal 
Why Kansas City? 
 Historically, urban sociologists have studied large urban centers, but as scholars have 
pointed out, smaller cities can teach us much about the urban experience (Brown-Saracino 2008). 
With a population of approximately 460,000 in a metropolitan region of 2.1 million, Kansas 
City, Missouri is a typical mid-sized Midwestern city. Its two largest racial groups, whites (63%) 
and blacks (29%), are likewise similar to other Midwestern cities, as is its history. During the 
post-World War II era, Kansas City’s downtown began a long-term decline in both population 
and economic centrality. Kansas City remains the anchoring city of the metropolitan region, but 
the suburbs are now self-sufficient political entities that provide many of the resources and 
attractions that once drew people downtown (Gotham 2001:288). A series of failed attempts at 
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urban renewal beginning in the 1960s resulted in the dilapidated conditions of Kansas City’s 
downtown that precipitated the Power and Light (P&L) District project. 
 The P&L project itself is reflective of larger global processes and can help us better 
understand large-scale, top-down urban renewal generally, not just in Kansas City. Serious 
planning for the project began in 2003 under the leadership of Mayor Kay Barnes and resulted in 
a $350 million public-private project between Kansas City and the Cordish Company. The 
project consists of eight square blocks of mixed-use development, ranging from bars and 
restaurants to retail and (currently undeveloped) residential space. While over half of the project 
was funded by the city, Cordish retains control over the P&L and exerts significant influence in 
the urban core. This is illustrative of the larger national and global trend in urban renewal 
wherein specialized firms are hired to develop mega-projects through public-private partnerships 
with cities (Murphy 2008; Smith 2002; Spierings 2009). Kansas City and the P&L can also 
contribute to our understanding of the effects of neoliberalism and the increasingly global 
mentality of privatism. 
Data 
 I employed an in-depth case study involving document analysis, interviews, and 
participant-observation to examine Kansas City’s urban renewal. Long held in high regard for 
studying urban settings, the case study approach allows the researcher to become intimately 
acquainted with the details of a specific case and can offer empirical and theoretical gains in 
understanding larger social forces (Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg 1991). I analyzed approximately 
200 newspaper articles in addition to city council records, real estate development documents, 
court records, business directories, community group documents (press materials, annual reports, 
committee minutes, etc.), and local blogs. I found newspaper articles by searching several online 
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databases for keywords pertinent to the P&L project and selected those that reflected a 
substantive focus on the project.  Because documents are produced in a matrix of power relations 
(Altheide 1996; Smith 2005), and the decisions to write, publish, and preserve texts are all 
influenced by these relations (Gallo 2009), I attempted to include various standpoints4
1996
 in my 
document analysis. For example, I included articles from the Kansas City Star, Kansas City’s 
mainstream newspaper, the KC Call, its weekly black community newspaper, The Pitch, a local 
weekly paper known to be politically liberal, and the KC Business Journal. Documents were 
coded for themes such as economic rationale, social justice, blight/dystopian discourse, and 
moral language. While some codes were developed based on elements of Neil Smith’s revanchist 
city thesis ( ) and Atkinson’s (2003) framework for evaluating the presence of revanchist 
policy and discourse, others were identified through a grounded theory approach (Charmaz 
2004). Thus, I began the document analysis with several preconceived themes pertinent to the 
revanchist thesis (e.g. economic rationale, dystopian discourse), but allowed other themes, 
including those contrary to the revanchist model such as “social justice,” to emerge as I analyzed 
the data. 
I also conducted seven semi-structured interviews with an urban planner, community 
residents, community group leaders, social activists, and a downtown business leader, and 
employed participant observation to supplement and contextualize my document analysis. 
Interviews and fieldwork were especially informative regarding issues of sexuality, as references 
to sexuality were rather rare in the document analysis. Interviewees ranged in age from their 
early twenties to late forties. Six interviewees were male; one was female. Five were white, one 
black, and one Latino. Five likewise identified as gay or queer, and two identified as 
heterosexual. Interviewees were selected purposively and were recruited either through cold-
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calling or personal contacts. Following DeVault and Gross (2007), I attempted to engage in 
collaborative conversations with my interviewees, allowing them to tell their stories and only 
loosely guiding the conversation. Interviews lasted from 20 minutes to nearly two hours, with the 
average interview lasting about 45 minutes. I recorded, transcribed, and then coded interviews 
for themes similar to those in the document analysis. Moral language and meta-narratives were 
especially important in coding interviews, as they demonstrate ways people make sense of 
experience and how discourse limits such expression (Sprague 2005). 
I spent approximately 10 hours in the Power and Light District from May 2011 to 
September 2011 to see who routinely used the area, how they were treated, how they acted, and 
more generally to get a feel for the environment. I conducted part of my field work during the 
Kansas City Gay Pride Festival, which was held in the Power and Light District June 3-5, 2011, 
in order to compare that time to more routine days in the P&L. Lastly, I attended a KC Pride 
community meeting regarding venue selection for the 2012 festival because controversy over the 
decision to hold Pride in the P&L continues in the queer community, and the meeting provided 
an opportunity for me to hear community members voice their concerns and support. 
I approached the data and this project from a “system-centered” approach to 
intersectionality (Choo and Ferree 2010). That is, I viewed race, class, gender, and sexuality as 
being at work in every situation and institutional setting and conceptualized inequalities as 
always determined by the particular historical and local processes in which they were found. I 
therefore attempt to draw attention to the ways these categories interact to produce inclusion or 
exclusion, including focusing a critical lens on often unmarked categories, such as whiteness, 
heterosexuality, maleness, and middle-class socio-economic status.  
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Findings 
 I present my findings in several subsections addressing the major concerns of this paper. I 
begin with an analysis of recent city and public-private initiatives and the discourse surrounding 
them in order to explore the possibility that a revanchist politics of urban renewal is emerging in 
Kansas City. The subsequent sections analyze two local cases involving the regulation of 
sexuality in Kansas City in an effort to evaluate how sexuality is implicated in the remake of the 
central city. Finally, I bring these two strands together to illustrate how sexualities are 
differentially employed in service of economic growth objectives. 
Planning for Power 
Discourse regarding the Power and Light (P&L) was permeated by a pro-growth 
ideology, such that little aside from economic growth was considered in the plan. This ideology, 
as I elaborate below, essentially posits that economic growth is the solution to all urban woes, 
including social and cultural inequities. The adage “a rising [economic] tide raises all boats” 
aptly describes Kansas City’s approach to urban renewal.  
The Downtown Council of Kansas City (DTC), according to its website, is “a non-profit, 
member-based organization that is devoted to the belief that a healthy, vibrant, and economically 
vital downtown is central to the success of the entire region” (www.downtownkc.org). It 
provides many services in the Central Business District (CBD), such as graffiti and trash 
removal, panhandling intervention, and referrals for homeless people. While these may be 
beneficial services, a closer inspection of the council’s website and press materials shows 
underlying economic objectives for these social services. 
 Goals of creating a safe and clean downtown are, in fact, “integral to the economic 
vitality of our community” (www.downtownkc.org), and welcoming diverse and vibrant cultures 
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is “the catalyst for attracting investment and economic activity” (ibid.). It appears that Kansas 
City elites have taken Richard Florida’s (2002) advice seriously, making every attempt to attract 
the “creative class.” Publicity materials from the DTC boast that 6,000 artists live in Kansas 
City, 308 arts related businesses employ 4,500 people in the city, and $973 million has been 
invested in arts and culture in downtown since 2000. As the DTC states, its social services are 
only in support of its “overarching mission to create an economically vibrant downtown.” 
 The DTC is not the only entity to espouse an economic rationale as the ultimate objective 
of urban renewal. The Economic Development Council (EDC) states that its “focus is on job 
growth, investment, tax revenues, sustainable development, and the ongoing beautification of 
Kansas City, Missouri, as a locale that is attractive to businesses” (www.edckc.com). On its own, 
this is not an issue, but as a city-supported agency the EDC receives vast powers in determining 
urban land development, and, in fact, wields the city’s most powerful development tool: tax 
increment financing (TIF). TIF essentially allows projects to be funded by future property, sales, 
utility, and earnings taxes generated by a redeveloped area, dramatically decreasing the initial 
investment necessary for a private developer to begin a project. The TIF Commission is further 
endowed with the power of eminent domain, allowing it to condemn businesses and residences 
standing in the path of economic development. 
 Mayor Barnes relied heavily on the EDC and TIF to accomplish her goal of redeveloping 
the CBD and many other areas5. The Power and Light deal alone added $295 million to the city’s 
TIF debt, which was to be covered by Super-TIF, a special kind of TIF that plows back 100% of 
taxes into the project, meaning the city gains no new tax revenue from the P&L until the bonds 
are paid in 23 years. The P&L has yet to generate enough revenue to cover its annual debt 
service, forcing the city to subsidize payments to private developers in the amount of $4.7 
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million in 2008 and $11.5 million in 2009. In July 2010, the city estimated it would have to 
subsidize the P&L bonds by $10-$15 million per year for as long as the bonds are outstanding. 
The 500-page P&L proposal that resulted in these shortcomings was given to the TIF 
Commission just moments before the hearing began, yet it passed that same day in a 7-2 vote, 
suggesting an overriding dedication to economic development regardless of cost. A close 
inspection of the proposal actually reveals that TIF financing for the P&L results in tax revenue 
loss for the Kansas City, Missouri school district during 12 of the 23 years that TIF will be in 
place, a quite real concern given the district’s recent loss of accreditation. A later amendment 
passed in a similarly rushed manner without public comment gave control of the public right-of-
way, including sidewalks, to Cordish. Perhaps the decision to adopt the plan is best justified by 
the warning from C.H. Johnson Consulting, “It is important for the future Kansas City, 
Missouri’s economic stability that this project be completed. If not…Kansas City will miss out 
on an opportunity to attract and retain tax dollars” (South Loop Entertainment District MODESA 
Application 2004:178). In actuality, an independent consulting firm found that Super-TIF yields 
no net financial benefit to the city (Horsley 2007). 
 Despite these drawbacks and evidence that TIF is unnecessary,6
Collison 2007
 the economic rationale 
necessary to support ideas like TIF abound in the discourse created around downtown renewal. 
When a new mayor took office in 2007 and called for a temporary halt on new TIF projects 
while policy was developed to strike a balance between economic growth and social justice, he 
was immediately lambasted. Council members likened the temporary halt to hanging a “closed” 
sign on the city and warned that Mayor Funkhouser had overstepped his bounds. One 
councilman asserted that “there’s a solid majority on the council that believes in economic 
development and that it’s the engine that drives neighborhoods forward” ( ). Mayor 
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Funkhouser was a one-term mayor. These events and the related discourse suggest an 
exceedingly strong dedication to economic growth, even at the cost of social services. Kansas 
City’s mechanisms for declaring land blighted also reveals a process undergirded by an 
economic growth ideology with little concern for social development and little accountability to 
elected officials. 
The Racial Face of Eminent Domain 
 The area where the P&L now stands was originally declared blighted in 1970 by the Land 
Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA), a semi-governmental entity responsible to its 
board of directors (not the city), which is selected largely from the Kansas City business 
community. Significant controversy surrounded this decision, and it eventually culminated in a 
case brought before the Missouri Supreme Court by local business owners who claimed that the 
area was not blighted because “only approximately 28% of the buildings in the project area are 
deteriorated or substandard to a degree requiring clearance…and only approximately 14% of the 
entire area is occupied by such buildings” (Parking Systems v. Downtown Redevelopment 
Corporation 1974). The court, however, deferred to the LCRA’s determination of blight, 
indicting a high degree of private sector control over development decisions. The project hit 
many roadblocks over the next 30 years, and the area languished under threat of condemnation 
until the P&L proposal was adopted in 2004. Ultimately, the blight declaration served to devalue 
the properties in the area, priming them for acquisition. 
In declaring the downtown loop blighted, the city also opened the way for the TIF 
Commission to invoke eminent domain, and it did so extensively. Of the 53 properties acquired 
to make way for the P&L, 16 (30%) were condemned. Eminent domain is generally reserved for 
projects that serve the public, such as roads, schools, and other infrastructure projects, so the use 
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of that power to clear land for a privately-owned entertainment district created significant 
controversy. In a 5-4 decision in the case of Kelo vs. New London, Connecticut, however, the 
Supreme Court ruled that taking private property, even if it is not blighted, for “carefully 
considered economic development” is legal as long as it benefits the community through such 
means as generating new taxes or creating new jobs. Here, once again, we find economic 
rationale justified through the rhetoric of “highest and best use.” As the Institute for Justice, 
which represented the New London homeowners, said, “no property in America is safe because 
anyone’s home can create more jobs if it is replaced by a business and any small business can 
generate greater taxes if replaced by a bigger one” (Garbus 2004). Two Kansas City cases 
illustrate this favoritism of big capital. 
 Gigi’s Wig Shop, formerly located near what is now the P&L, was a small business that 
had been in the same building for 20 years when the TIF Commission offered to acquire it. 
Gigi’s stood just outside the boundaries set for the P&L development, and the city provided 
Gigi’s owner with no concrete reason for why he was being asked to sell (Martin 2005). When 
he refused to sell, the city began condemnation proceedings, eventually forcing Gigi’s to close. 
The land was then sold to Copaken, White, and Blitt, a major downtown real estate developer, in 
exchange for land Copaken owned within the entertainment district bounds. Copaken intended to 
convert the land into a surface parking lot—the type of “physical blight” that the city allegedly 
wanted eradicated (ibid.). Comments from another developer who previously attempted to buy 
Gigi’s may reveal ulterior motives: “There are certain things we won’t have in the project. It’s 
not a racist thing. It’s a matter of taste” (Shelly 1997). Nearly all of Gigi’s customers were black.  
Another successful local business with a largely black clientele shared Gigi’s fate. 
American Formal Wear, formerly located in what is now the heart of the P&L, was similarly 
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condemned. After the owner of AFW, Daryl Penner, refused to sell, the city took him to court. A 
jury eventually awarded Penner $1.1 million for his business, up from the city’s offer of 
$593,000. Penner, however, remained upset that he was not offered a new location within the 
downtown loop where his clients have known him to be for decades, and, in fact, after relocating 
to Mission, KS, AFW went out of business. 
Other relocations were not dependent on eminent domain. Cordish struck a deal with the 
city to move a bus stop out of the P&L area, and as the Pitch reports, the only two bus lines 
currently running through the P&L serve predominantly white neighborhoods (Martin 2007). 
Cordish also vehemently opposed a proposed light rail line that would border the P&L. Several 
day labor centers in downtown were convinced to relocate, and Cordish even negotiated with the 
Kansas City Division of Employment Security, a state unemployment office, to move it out of 
the area. Finally, “in a combination of self-interest and compassion” (Collison 2010), the DTC 
partnered with Episcopal Community Services to build a new dining facility for the Kansas City 
homeless population. The former facility was on the west side of the P&L, and the shelter was on 
the east side, forcing many homeless people to migrate across the refurbished downtown to 
receive a meal. As Collison continues, “the long walk—about 3.6 miles roundtrip—is not only a 
hassle for the homeless, but it didn’t help with renewed efforts to market downtown.” While the 
relocation surely made life more convenient for many homeless people, thinly veiled economic 
objectives reveal the DTC’s intent. The relocations pursued by the city for the P&L reveal the 
intersecting race and class revanchism engendered by devotion to economic growth. By 
removing businesses and institutions that predominantly served racial minorities and lower- and 
working-class people, the city, with Cordish as its agent, is effectively communicating that those 
groups are not part of Kansas City’s urban renewal vision and are not welcome within its 
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bounds. Several policy decisions also work to reify these race and class boundaries, as the 
following section demonstrates. 
Revanchist Policy or Justified Precautions? 
 In the spring of 2007, Kansas City began reworking its panhandling restrictions, with 
special attention to five entertainment districts, one of which was the P&L. Despite the city’s 
existing law banning “aggressive panhandling,” Councilman John Fairfield proposed an 
ordinance that would outlaw all forms of panhandling (including street performances and 
“passive panhandling” such as putting out a hat without verbally requesting money). The 
ordinance aimed only at designated entertainment districts. The proposal states its goal “is to 
protect citizens from fear, harassment, and intimidation accompanying panhandling, which has 
become an unwelcome, overwhelming, and dangerous presence in certain parts of the city” 
(Helling 2007). In a statement endorsing the proposed law, the Greater Kansas City Chamber of 
Commerce agreed that panhandling was a matter of public safety and referred to panhandlers as 
“visual blight” (Helling and Horsley 2007).  
 The proposal was eventually amended to ban “aggressive panhandling” city-wide and 
“verbal panhandling” in five entertainment areas, including the P&L. Only “passive 
panhandling” is allowed within entertainment districts, though not near store entrances. 
Interestingly, without informing the city council, the Kansas City Police Department announced 
it would not enforce the law because it believed the ordinance to be unconstitutional. The law, 
however, remains on the books, and the P&L, with its private security force, continues to enforce 
it (Janovy 2008). 
 In a separate move, the DTC has also dispatched community ambassadors to help clear 
the downtown streets of homeless people. The DTC Community Improvement District’s 2010-11 
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annual report boasts 5,587 homeless contacts and referrals and 908 aggressive panhandler 
interventions (DTC CID Annual Report 2011). Community ambassadors also took up posts at 
freeway exit ramps known for panhandling and distributed pamphlets reading “aggressive 
panhandling will stop when people stop rewarding such behavior—it’s that simple” (Martin 
2009). Such zero tolerance laws and attitudes are characteristic of revanchist urban policy 
(Atkinson 2003; Smith 1996). 
 More recently, the city tightened its youth curfew, once again specifically targeting five 
designated entertainment areas. The new policy, which took effect August 19, 2011, sets a 10 
P.M. curfew for youths 15 and under and an 11 P.M. curfew for 16 and 17-year-olds citywide. In 
the five designated entertainment districts, however, the curfew is 9 P.M. for all youths under 18. 
The former curfew was a uniform 11 P.M. on weekdays and midnight on weekends citywide. 
The council also amended the punishment for a first-time curfew violation from $1 to a 
maximum of $500. 
 This was not the first time this issue had emerged. In 2010, the city convened a summit 
concerning large groups of teens amassing in shopping and entertainment areas and concluded 
that more free and reduced-price activities for youth were needed. Neither the city nor the private 
sector took action after the summit. Instead, 16 months later, the city deployed groups of police 
officers on foot, horseback, 4-wheelers, and cars to defend the Plaza, a posh shopping district, 
from youths. Similarly, after a shooting in the P&L in 2008, the president of Cordish sent Mayor 
Funkhouser an angry email saying, “VISIBLE POLICE PRESENCE IS THE SINGLE MOST 
POWERFUL WAY TO REASSURE PEOPLE AS TO THE SAFETY OF AN AREA. IN 
ADDITION, THE POLICE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO ALL GANGS THAT THE 
DOWNTOWN IS AN AREA OF ‘ZERO TOLERANCE’” (Martin 2008:capital letters in 
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original). Once again, we find a strong rhetoric of zero tolerance, ranging from Cordish’s 
outright statement to the city’s threat of a $500 fine for missing curfew.  
The real effects of the curfew are heavily raced and classed. A majority of the youths in 
question are black, and many live in areas without amenities, such as movie theaters, that areas 
like the Plaza and P&L provide (Bradley 2011). By creating a differential curfew for 
entertainment areas and the rest of the city, the new policy effectively displaces the issue and 
communicates that those areas are valued over other sections of the city. It not only denies a 
largely black youth population the use of these entertainment spaces, it also works to protect 
these areas as places of white, middle-class consumption free of racial and class “others.” 
The above rhetoric and policies articulate together to suggest a concerted race and class 
remake of the central city consistent with Neil Smith’s revanchist city theory (Smith 1996). The 
heavy emphasis on economic objectives to the detriment of social justice issues is also reflective 
of the elevation of “exchange value” above “use value” characteristic of Logan and Molotch’s 
(1987) urban growth machine. The privatization of the very sidewalks in the P&L not only works 
to make once-public space available for economic gain, it also allows for more effective policing 
of the raced and classed boundaries created through city policies and actions. These same 
exclusionary strategies backed by economic rationale are also used to control the visibility and 
access of sexual “others” in the P&L, as the subsequent sections illustrate. 
Regulating Sex 
In August 2004, Temptations, a full nudity strip club located near the P&L, petitioned the 
city for an expansion. With the expansion, Temptations would become semi-nude and be 
allowed to sell alcohol, which would subject it to stricter regulation and oversight from the city. 
To the delight of the city, Temptations would also remove the “Totally Nude” sign gracing the 
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façade of the building to be replaced by “classier” Penthouse franchise signage. But some were 
still concerned that having a strip club so near the P&L would be bad for business. 
Before the expansion happened, the Missouri legislature passed a state law prohibiting 
full nudity and requiring that strippers wear pasties over their breasts. The law also mandated 
that performers be at least 10 feet from patrons on a stage with a railing and prohibited all 
physical contact and the showing of pornographic movies in private rooms. Lastly, the law 
required that all patrons and employees be at least 21 years old, even if the club does not serve 
alcohol. This was the latest in a series of laws aimed at adult businesses in Missouri7
Citing depressed property values and “other negative secondary effects” such as 
prostitution, Matt Blunt, then governor of Missouri, stated that “I think it is appropriate for us to 
take action to curb activities at these types of businesses and to take good, positive steps to 
protect the health of citizens and of our state” (
. 
Hoover 2005). When available evidence is 
examined, however, neither of Governor Blunt’s reasons is justified. The director of the 
Neighborhood and Community Services Department of Kansas City, the agency charged with 
regulating adult businesses, stated that no sexually oriented businesses in Kansas City have had 
problems with prostitution. Moreover, the Crossroads District, the area where Temptations and 
another strip club, Bazookas, are located have experienced dramatic property value increases in 
recent years—so much so that many of the small businesses and art galleries in the area have 
petitioned City Hall for relief from sky-rocketing property taxes (Collison 2003a). The law never 
took effect before it was struck down by the Missouri Supreme Court for violating state 
restrictions on “log-rolling,” or tacking on unrelated amendments to bills in order to more easily 
push them through the legislature. 
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Temptations tried again for its expansion, but this time the Kansas City Parks and 
Recreation Department threatened to stop it. KC Parks and Recreation regulates Kansas City’s 
boulevards, and Temptations is located on Grand Boulevard. Regulations passed in 2007 by the 
park board prohibit what it considers “seedy” businesses, including payday loan shops, used car 
lots, and adult businesses from existing along KC’s boulevards. Temptations itself was 
grandfathered in because it had been located on Grand for decades, but its expansion was 
jeopardized.  
Several people spoke against the expansion, claiming that adult businesses are morally 
corrupt and cause crime, disease, property devaluation, and blight. The local Catholic bishop and 
archbishop sent a letter warning “that a strip club…threatens to destroy the burgeoning family-
friendly atmosphere of the downtown community” (Campbell 2008)—a curious argument 
considering the P&L’s reputation as a drinking destination. Despite the controversy, the 
expansion was approved in a 5-2 vote, allowing Temptations to expand in exchange for the 
removal of its “totally nude” sign and sending the issue to the Planning and Zoning Committee 
for final approval. The Zoning Committee refused to hear the proposal, though, effectively 
killing the request. When questioned, the Chairman of the committee simply said that they were 
concerned that if they approved the request other sexually oriented businesses would try to open 
in the area, and that was not the message they wished to send (Star 2008). 
The condemnation of two other sexually oriented businesses, the Gold Mine Lounge and 
Magic Touch Massage Parlor also illustrate this trend. The city invoked eminent domain against 
both establishments to clear land for the P&L. Similarly, Soakie’s Lounge, a bar catering to a 
mostly black, gay, male clientele, was forced out of downtown. In June, 2004, the city simply 
denied Soakie’s a renewal of its business license. 
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The P&L now stands in their place with a dress code that, among other things, prohibits 
sleeveless shirts on men and exposed undergarments, including undershirts, on men. Women, 
conversely, can wear practically whatever they want, and some businesses within the P&L 
demonstrate this with a flourish. At one bar waitresses wear chaps over bikini bottoms and low-
cut tops. At another, women are encouraged to dance on elevated platforms around the dance 
floor while men are prohibited. Policies like these clearly announce that the P&L is an area 
where women are to be on display for men, and men should certainly not be looking to show off 
their bodies. On the one hand, conservative legislators argue that combining alcohol and 
undressed women is dangerous and will not be tolerated in order to legitimate legislation aimed 
at shutting down strip clubs (Kraske 2010). But on the other, they use tax payer money to 
subsidize an entertainment district full of bars with waitresses wearing revealing clothing and 
hosting events where the main attraction is porn star Jenna Jameson. It appears that the city 
simply traded one type of sexualized space for another, in line with Hubbard et al’s (2008) 
assertion that society promotes certain forms of heterosexual expression through geographic 
placement of businesses. 
This discourse and the resulting actions reveal how race, class, gender, and sexuality are 
all implicated in the remake of downtown. Sex and race become associated with decreased 
property values because they detract from the image of the central city as a safe space for white, 
middle-class consumption (Gotham 2002; Papayanis 2000), and are therefore treated in similar 
ways. Because pornography and sex work are often associated with the lower classes (Knopp 
1995), a class dimension is also suggested. Threatening sexualities, such as sex work, 
pornography, and queers who do not conform to white, middle-class, heteronormative standards 
are thus framed as contributing to blight and moral degradation of urban areas, which legitimizes 
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their exclusion and allows growth machine actors to create a dystopian image of the areas 
inhabited by such sexualized businesses and sexual citizens. As Jane Ward (2008) argues, these 
elements of the queer community are no longer included in what mainstream LGBT 
organizations and their corporate sponsors see as marketable diversity. That is, they are too 
foreign, too threatening to the general sexphobic public, and they are therefore excluded from 
areas of public visibility, especially cosmopolitan urban renewal areas. 
Clearing away sexual and racial “blight” through eminent domain and other 
governmental mechanisms allows these once-public and semi-public spaces to be privatized for 
capital accumulation, and legislating particular locations that are appropriate for “non-
conforming” sexualities (e.g. not on boulevards, not within 1,000 feet of a church, park, etc.) 
effectively institutionalizes these spatial inequities. Moreover, a dress code that normalizes 
particular gender and sexual expressions contributes to a hierarchical defining of “good” and 
“bad” sexual citizens based on the morality of a largely white, male, heterosexual, bourgeois 
elite. These developments suggest that moral boundaries are being reified in space and law, 
resulting in real inequalities—in this case, unequal access to public space. 
Power the Light with Pride 
In 2010, Show Me Pride, LLC, the organization that coordinates Kansas City Gay Pride, 
held part of the festival in the Power and Light District amid vocal opposition from some in the 
queer community. At issue were not only the racism allegations (which affect people of color in 
the queer community), but also the gendered and heterosexist tone of the dress code. The dress 
code reads “no sleeveless shirts on men, no exposed undergarments, including undershirts on 
men.” While this seems innocuous on its surface, the subtle modifier on men certainly 
contributes to a heterosexing and gendering of the space. Why is it okay for undergarments to be 
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exposed on women but not on men? As suggested above, the language tacitly suggests that this is 
a space in which women are to be gazed upon, not men. Other issues arise for different groups in 
the queer community, as well. Transgender women who dress as women but do not yet “pass” 
(or choose not to pass) as such may be denied entry if they decide to wear a tank top, for 
instance. Protesters made it clear that they understood the issues at stake, waving signs that read 
“They want your money not your pride” and “If I can dress like a slut, why can’t he?” 
According to Jonathan, a 25 year old queer social activist, the most pressing issue for 
protesters was the dress code, which they viewed as classist, racist, gendered, homophobic, and 
transphobic. In addition to the issues for transgender people and the heterosexing and gendering 
mentioned above, the original dress code also banned white T-shirts, exposed jewelry on men, 
baggy clothing, sports attire, hats, shirts hanging below pants pockets, shorts below the calf 
(excluding capris on women), and work boots among other things. Opponents of the dress code 
argued that it targeted black men and other minorities, especially due to complaints that white 
patrons wearing prohibited clothing were admitted while black patrons wearing similar clothing 
were not. Cordish claimed that the code was enforced evenly and denied any racism, but after a 
black city councilwoman’s son was denied entry to the P&L because of his attire, the Kansas 
City Council took action. On April 2, 2009 the council passed an ordinance restricting dress 
codes in any development receiving tax payer assistance, doing away with the P&L bans on 
jewelry on men, headgear, pant length, and white T-shirts, though white undershirts were still 
prohibited. 
Despite the changes, complaints of racial discrimination continued, and the Kansas City 
Human Rights Commission acted. It conducted a study in which 11 similarly dressed males 
between the ages of 22 and 32 were sent to try to enter the central pavilion of the P&L and a 
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business within the district. Three of the men were white, 5 were black, and 3 were Latino. The 
test showed that the white men were admitted 100% of the time (even though one was wearing 
excessively long athletic shorts), while the men of color were only admitted 44% of the time, or 
9 out of their 16 attempts. Despite the announcement of these findings in November 2009, 
Cordish refused to admit wrong-doing or attempt to make amends. Instead it offered to hire a 
third-party contractor to enforce the dress code with a board of community members to oversee 
the contractor. But as one local newspaper points out:  
The hiring of a contractor to enforce the code and the proposed community oversight 
board do little more than provide a mechanism to shift accountability away from Cordish. 
Future complaints from would-be patrons? Tell the board, not Cordish. Unannounced 
tests show problems with enforcement (as happened in a recent city test)? Then the board 
should fire the contractor” (Kansas City Business Journal Editorial 2009). 
 
Moreover, while the oversight board nominally seeks diverse community representation, several 
prominent black leaders refused to participate out of protest. Jonathan also says he was offered a 
seat on the board, but when he expressed interest he was never contacted again. Almost seven 
months later in May, 2010, with Kansas City Gay Pride coming to the P&L (along with its 
accompanying protest) and two national black conventions coming to Kansas City in the 
following months, the P&L quietly changed its dress code again. The newly revised code reads, 
“The following is not permitted under the KC Live! dress code: sleeveless shirts on men; 
profanity on clothing; sweat pants or full sweat suits; bandanas; exposed undergarments 
(including undershirts) on men” (www.powerandlightdistrict.com). Anecdotal evidence 
continues to suggest that P&L does not consistently enforce its dress code. Blake, a gay, white 
man in his 20s, was denied entry to the P&L area because he was wearing a deep V-neck shirt 
that the bouncer judged to reveal too much male skin. Blake judged his shirt to be no different 
from the men already admitted who were wearing button-down shirts unbuttoned enough to 
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reveal the same chest area that his shirt exposed, but the bouncer’s decision stood. He was not 
allowed access even to the outdoor central pavilion area (interview with Blake). Likewise, Julie, 
a self-identified “butch lesbian” in her early 20s, claimed that she was denied entry because she 
was wearing a tank top even though the dress code allows tank tops on women. She believes it 
was because of her gender presentation, which, in accordance with her butch identity, is 
conventionally masculine (interview with Julie). 
Much of this controversy affects people of color and lower socioeconomic status, so the 
organizers of the Pride protest were often questioned about their motivation. Jonathan explains: 
The most infuriating question during all of this was, like, we got it all the time. “I 
understand the district is racist. That’s not a question in my mind. But what does that 
have to do with the gay community?” That is just such an infuriating question to me and 
the other organizers—that that is what the gay community is perceived as—totally white 
and homogenous, which is not what it is. We felt that defending that idea that we’re not 
all white, upper-middle class, willing to just hang out at the bars instead of community 
space. We felt that that was too important not to protest (Jonathan, queer, white, male). 
 
Jonathan’s sentiment here draws attention to an area of significant controversy within the 
LGBTQ communities, namely that the community as a whole is perceived to be (mostly) white, 
(mostly) male, and generally economically privileged (Gamson 2004; Maynard 2004; Valocchi 
1999). This image has been honed over many years by gay businesses and media, which have 
pursued a “normalization-via-consumption” strategy (Chasin 2000; Sender 2004). That is, while 
queers have gained increased visibility in the media, the representations are often stereotyped 
images of gay men as master consumers, such as Queer Eye for the Straight Guy in which five 
gay men (each an expert in a particular area of consumption: food, culture, home, fashion, body) 
make a straight man “better” by teaching him how to become a master consumer himself. Such 
representations reify a class-specific image of the LGBTQ community  as being firmly part of 
the upper-middle class (Gamson 2004)—an image that has been discredited by economists 
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(Badgett 2001). As Ward (2008:12) adds, this tactic “not only lends support to the misconception 
that all lesbians and gay men are white, middle class, and invested in being normal, but it also 
drains queer politics of its most countercultural and critical impulses.” This leads directly to the 
second issue with holding Gay Pride in the P&L. Should Pride be held in an area billed as the 
consumption capital of the region, especially when the company does not have a particularly 
good track record on civil rights? 
They want your money, not your Pride 
After Show Me Pride deemed the 2010 event in the P&L a success, the organization 
decided to move the entire festival to the P&L for 2011. In order to experience the move first-
hand, I attended the Power the Light with Pride kick-off event on June 3, 2011 with my 
boyfriend, whom I asked to wear a tank-top. We were both admitted with no questions asked, 
and as I soon discovered so were many other people in violation of the dress code. As it turns 
out, the P&L dropped the dress code for the three-day Pride festival. During Pride, P&L decided, 
it was okay for men to wear sleeveless shirts. According to a P&L official, the reasoning was as 
follows: 
 [W]hen there’s an expectation that, you know, in particular, sleeveless shirts on men is 
something that’s not on the dress code, and there were going to be a lot of men wearing 
sleeveless shirts. For that reason it wasn’t practical to have it in place (Mark, 
heterosexual, white, male). 
 
This was a notable exception to his earlier claim during our interview that the dress code was for 
everyone’s safety. The P&L’s motivations seemed more transparent when I asked how sales 
during Pride weekend compared with an average weekend: “[I]t was a strong weekend… it was 
one of the better weekends of the year. It definitely had a positive impact on sales” (interview 
with Mark). When I put the same issue to David, a Show Me Pride representative, asking what 
happens to our community in the P&L the other 362 days of the year, he responded positively: 
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…as one of our protesters said last year when we did the street dance, “So for 5 hours 
they’re gonna relax their dress code? Five hours—that’s just not enough. That’s just 
stupid and how dare you see that as an advance.” Well, it was 5 hours last year. It was 3 
days this year. And who knows what might happen if we continue to go and show them 
that dress really isn’t critical or crucial to the success of or decline of your area (David, 
gay, white, male). 
 
But the question consuming many in the LGBTQ community is why we would choose to have 
Gay Pride in an area that only welcomes us as we are for three days of the year.  
One of the primary justifications offered by Show Me Pride for moving the festival to 
P&L has been financial. According to Show Me Pride’s financial records the move to P&L was 
an economic windfall for the organization, saving it over $80,000 in expenses to put on the 
festival. P&L provided security, restrooms, a stage, utilities, and various other amenities that 
normally cost thousands of dollars. From a financial standpoint, holding Pride at the P&L is 
completely justified.  
These financial concerns, however, dovetail with other concerns that members of the 
Kansas City queer community have. Namely, should the queer community be financially and 
politically supporting an organization that only appears to support the queer community three 
days of the year, and should Show Me Pride’s primary concern be saving $80,000 instead of 
providing a location where all members of the community can feel welcome and safe? These 
questions point to a concern that Kansas City now shares with many other pride festivals: “the 
growth of gay capitalism and the corporate sponsorship of ‘pride’ have naturalized the logic that 
pride events are opportunities for tremendous revenue…and, as such, these opportunities should 
go to the best organizations, vis-à-vis competition” (Ward 2003:88). But as Ward also asserts, 
“the accessibility and character of the locale is important as well” (2003:87). During our 
interview, David stated that he felt safer and more comfortable in the P&L than he did in a park 
or on the streets of the Crossroads District and that he believed patrons of Pride felt the same. It 
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is significant to note that David is a white, middle-aged, male business owner (and so 
presumably financially comfortable), as are many of the members of the Show Me Pride 
executive board. It certainly seems reasonable to assume that people with those traits would feel 
comfortable in an area described by the developers as having a “refined loft” architectural style. 
It remains the case, however, that many in the queer community do not feel the way David does, 
and many have experienced discrimination in the area. Several interviewees also expressed 
feelings that the very essence of Pride had changed with the move to the P&L. 
Well, with the other venues…everybody looks forward to gay pride because that’s the 
weekend that you get the opportunity to just be yourself. You’re around people. You can 
just be free. That spirit is not there at the P&L because you have to dress a certain way, 
you have to conduct yourself to a certain standard, and all that wasn’t involved when we 
would come to the park (Gary, gay, black, male). 
 
I observed during my fieldwork that Pride did, in fact, seem toned down. Absent were the usual 
barrage of leather-daddies, drag queens, and shirtless men, suggesting, as Binnie and Skeggs 
(2004) note of Manchester’s gay village, that as heterosexuals are courted, the more extreme 
aspects of queer culture are downplayed or excluded. 
Because of the continued unrest over moving Pride to the P&L, Show Me Pride held a 
community input meeting to consider other venues for the 2012 festival. The demographic 
composition of the audience is worth considering in the following account. Not including my 
boyfriend and me, who sat in the back as neutral observers, there were 19 white men, mostly 
middle-aged and older, 3 men of color, 1 straight, white woman, and 2 young, white lesbians.  
During the meeting, those in attendance agreed on the following criteria for choosing a 
venue: size, parking/transportation, accessibility, utilities, safety, amenities, cost, layout, 
inclusivity/how welcoming the venue is, is the administration a good partner. The group further 
decided that the three most important factors were, in this order, accessibility, cost, and parking. 
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The conversation during the meeting, however, suggested that cost was the top priority. When 
ratings were given for categories such as parking, safety, and utilities, public venues such as 
parks were graded down because it would cost money to provide such services, whereas a venue 
such as P&L includes these things.  
The debate over the term “inclusivity” seemed particularly telling. A middle-aged white 
man representing the Human Rights Campaign suggested that inclusivity be defined as 
welcoming people other than queers during Pride so as to pull in people that wouldn’t normally 
come to such an event but are open to learning about it. Clearly, such a definition would favor 
the P&L as a heavily trafficked night-life scene in Kansas City. One of the young, white lesbians 
suggested that we consider instead how diverse members of our community feel in the space and 
whether they feel welcome before we consider catering to heterosexuals. Her suggestion was 
readily dismissed by an executive board member of Show Me Pride as a utopian vision. We will 
never satisfy everyone in our community, he bluntly argued, implying that even attempting to do 
so was foolish. This back and forth between the two lesbians and various men characterized the 
debate over inclusivity, with the lesbians offering stories of discrimination in the P&L, as well as 
accounts of women with children who did not feel comfortable attending Pride in a designated 
drinking area, or youth who could not attend for various reasons associated with P&L’s image as 
a bar district, and the men offering nebulous rebuttals such as everyone will feel uncomfortable 
somewhere and the perception of P&L as only a bar district is incorrect. The male-female 
dynamic here is particularly noteworthy, and has been the subject of feminist critiques of LGBT 
organizations (Ward 2008). In the end, the audience reached no decision on inclusivity, and each 
venue was graded “Ok,” effectively eliminating inclusivity as a criterion. 
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Not only was inclusivity—perhaps the most damning factor for P&L—dismissed, but as 
mentioned above, accessibility, cost, and parking were prioritized over inclusivity, safety, and 
whether the venue administration is a good partner to the LGBTQ community. As a modern 
facility the P&L obviously would score well on accessibility and parking, and as a private 
company the P&L was able to make donations to Show Me Pride to keep costs down. That is, 
Show Me Pride was given a reduced price in exchange for making P&L the lead sponsor of the 
festival. Because P&L was expected to score highly (and did) on these three variables and 
because accessibility, cost, and parking were weighted four, three, and two times greater, 
respectively, it was a foregone conclusion that P&L would score the highest. A comment from 
David perhaps sums up Show Me Pride’s justification: “Maybe at some point when the straight 
bars down there [the P&L] realize that gay people are a lot more fun and have more money than 
the straight people…the Power and Light District could be our gayborhood” (interview with 
David; emphasis added). 
The decision to hold Pride in a designated consumption area and to bill the LGBTQ 
community as affluent reinforces the “normalization-via-consumption” paradigm, encouraging 
conspicuous consumption as the route to full citizenship. Figure 1, a poster used by Show Me 
Pride to recruit sponsors, illustrates this approach. Furthermore, seeking to make Pride 
welcoming to heterosexuals rather than queers suggests a heteronormative agenda, what Lisa 
Duggan (2002) calls the “new homonormativity.” This approach is in line with the mainstream 
LGBT movement’s choice to pursue “rights traditionally granted to white, middle-class 
heterosexuals, such as privacy, domesticity, and consumption” (Ward 2008:12) rather than 
cultural acceptance. Moving Pride from a public park to a privatized shopping district also 
valorizes public relations based on the interests of private property and capital accumulation, and 
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undercuts the original intent of Pride celebrations as radical acts of queer visibility meant to 
disrupt hegemonic scripts. Ultimately, the same economic rationale that characterizes the larger 
revanchist enterprise applies to sexuality, as well. Non-hegemonic sexual expressions are 
eliminated or excluded in order to secure the area for white, middle-class, (largely) heterosexual 
consumption, and non-threatening sexual “others” (i.e. white, middle-class, gay men) are courted 
to lend the P&L legitimacy as a welcoming and diverse space. Sexual diversity is thus co-opted 
and mobilized by corporate real estate developers and local government in a very race-, class-, 
and gender-specific manner that at once advances growth objectives and reinforces the white, 
heterosexual, middle-class values of heteronormativity, private property, and conspicuous 
consumption. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Conclusion 
 Like New York’s Times Square, Kansas City’s Power and Light District serves as 
another example of a revanchist urban renewal strategy. City officials, in tandem with real estate 
and business professionals, focused on economic goals to the detriment of social justice issues, 
resulting in an urban space infused with a bourgeois morality that reflects, promulgates and 
engenders social inequalities along the axes of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Rather than 
creating an inclusive pubic space Kansas City has created an exclusive pseudo-public space 
intended for white, middle-class consumers. Within this configuration, non-hegemonic 
sexualities are alternately courted or excluded in line with the goals of the growth machine. On 
the one hand, exclusionary policies regarding “threatening” sexual expressions, such as sex 
work, pornography, and non-white, non-middle-class portions of the LGBTQ community work 
to institutionalize and territorialize white, bourgeois conceptions of sexual morality in order to 
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sanitize urban space for white, middle-class consumption. On the other, middle-class, white, gay 
men are courted by growth machine actors as ideal consumers and gentrifiers, and to lend a 
marketable aura of diversity and cosmopolitanism to Kansas City’s renewed spaces. 
 While revanchist attitudes were largely uncontested in the discourse surrounding urban 
renewal, the fact that the KC Police Department was unwilling to enforce a harsh panhandling 
ordinance and that Mayor Funkhouser attempted to make social justice a viable issue suggests 
that some individual growth machine actors are not concerned only with economic objectives. 
Funkhouser’s failure and the persistence of the panhandling law, however, demonstrate how 
ingrained growth objectives are. While this single-city study is limited in its generalizability, the 
findings observed in Kansas City add to our understanding of sexuality’s role in urban renewal, 
particularly how sexualities are mobilized by growth machine actors to create exclusive 
consumer spaces. Conventional wisdom is that gay men are gentrifiers because of their 
willingness to move into dilapidated areas and use their cultural and economic capital to 
transform these neighborhoods. These findings suggest a reevaluation of this analysis in light of 
the changing nature of gentrification as an organized economic activity. The Kansas City case 
suggests that gay men may now be courted by large-scale urban renewal actors instead of 
becoming first-wave gentrifiers themselves. 
 This study also brings up issues of access to public space and sexual equality. Access to 
public space is a long-held component of citizenship in a democratic society, and movements for 
sexual citizenship have therefore often sought legitimation through visibility in public spaces. 
The increasing privatization of once-public spaces limits these movements for sexual equality 
and acceptance, especially when sexual minorities themselves condone, intentionally or not, such 
capital accumulation strategies that tokenize queers. Radical sexual spaces should strive to 
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disrupt hegemonic sexual and moral scripts rather than legitimate them. Given the tendency for 
capital to commodify queer space, however, future research should seek to understand how these 
spatial dynamics are affecting claims to sexual equality and sexual citizenship, and how, why, 
and under what conditions queers become co-opted in redefining space. In recent years, the 
LGBTQ movement has largely argued for equality on economic and political grounds. As former 
director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Urvashi Vaid (1995:106), writes: “We 
consciously chose legal reform, political access, visibility, and legitimation over the long-term 
goals of cultural acceptance, social transformation, understanding, and liberation.” Queer public 
spaces have the potential to advance arguments for equality on these cultural and social fronts 
through encouraging a true appreciation of diversity, but only when the public sphere and public 
spaces are truly public. 
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Figure 1 – KC Gay Pride Advertisement 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Interviewees 
 
Pseudonym Position 
Jonathan Queer social activist 
David KC Pride officer 
Gary KC Black Gay Pride officer 
Blake Gay Community member 
Julie Lesbian community member 
Mark Power and Light official 
James Urban planner 
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1 Florida asserts that people in the “creative class”—artists, architects, engineers, etc.—seek and are accepting of 
diversity, and thus, one way to attract this group (which increasingly drives the American economy) is to create a 
diverse or cosmopolitan environment. 
2 Privatism is the belief that the market is the best way to allocate resources and that it is government’s job to 
support the market in order to maximize individual choice and freedom (Squires 1994; Antonio and Bonanno 1997). 
3 Symbolic boundaries are social and cultural distinctions that define some people, groups, and things while 
excluding others (Epstein 2002). 
4 I refer here to standpoint epistemology’s assertion that knowledge is produced in a particular matrix of physical 
location, history, material interests, and culture (Sprague 2005). 
5 From 1997-2003 (Barnes began in 1999), TIF payments to developers almost quadrupled, increasing from $10 
million to $39 million annually. That translates into almost 9% of city sales taxes and a resultant loss of $10.7 
million per year from the city treasury for projects that did not earn enough through TIF to pay developers (KC Star 
12-18-03). Shortcomings in TIF must be paid by the city itself. 
6 Cincinnati and Cleveland, OH, Fort Worth, TX, Minneapolis, MN, and Charlotte, NC have all undertaken major 
downtown projects without granting tax incentives to private capital. 
7 A 2003 law raised the minimum age for nude dancers from 18 to 19, and a 2004 statute banned sexually oriented 
billboards within a mile of state highways. 
 
 
 
